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de Beer

have the discussions in a reciprocal way
talk as people to people?

Saikat Majumdar

Founded on empirical data - verbatim quotations, with minor modification, from transcribed intervieiv with Prof Catherine Odora I loppers, 28
November 2001.

Globalization, or the Vanishing Present of
Postcolonialism? (and the Figuration of the
Com prador-Intel lectua I)

Of Cousins and Cannibals

Globalization in 25 Words or Less

Between the horrifying myth and the over-simplified discourse is the
reality, where from an edge of many sil ent tears a few greedily sm il e.
Felicity Paynter
University of Leicester
Leicester, England

Food, places, people- everything looks pretty much the same.
James Chia
National University of Singapore
Singapore

Globalization is the intertwining of nations in order to 1ink the entire
world and promote the unity of all people.
Kim Gasser
University of Kentucky
Uni led Stales
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Looking back, few theorizations of the relationship between postcolonial studies and the discourses of globalization stand out in my mind as
strikingly as that articulated by a professor at
Princeton, who, on the very first day of a graduate eminar on the subject, announced: "To the
new entrants to the area of po tcolonial theory, it
i now time to say 'Hello, it' over! Welcome to
the di cour e of globalization.,,,
Carrying the legacy of urban, middle-class,
educated Calcutta, speaking and writing in
English, pur uing a doctorate in British modernist literature, I could have hardly considered
myself a new entrant in the field of postcolonial
studies at that point in time. Few members of the
clas cou ld have, I uppo e. Coming from corners
of the globe a diver e and PoCo-friendly (or
hostile, depending on the mood, time and place)
a the Anglophone and Francophone Caribbean
i land , China Morocco, Turkey, England Canada and South-Africa not to mention Americans
from all over the country, everyone in the class
eemed to have been engaged with one ort of
(post)co lonial legacy or another. And no mere
'native informant' essentia lism either- they all
were engaged in reckonings, epistemic and personal, of not only such legacie , but of a more
abstracted theorization of the encounters with
empire in a larger, global pace. Not 'Empire, I
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maintain, but 'empire'-one has to refrain from the upper-case 'E' to
denote a pre-Hardt-and Negriapsarian innocence. Inside-out ide binaries were sti ll functional in such theorization, and we'd probably have
frowned upon the Orwellian anonymity of the ' multitude.'
Globalization, however, for me, was another animal altogether. As
a teenager in India, I remember 1991 as a watershed year, or one that
everybody considered to be such. That was the magic year when Dr.
Manmohan Singh, the finance minister of the Narasimah Rao-led tottering minority Congress government, was supposed to have opened the
floodgates of the Indian market to the mythical giants of globalization
and liberalization, ending nearly half a century of Nehruvian experimentation with socialist models. Like other mythical animals of contemporary politics, these two beasts (we weren't really sure whether
these were two, twinned, or one and the same) impressed more by their
accompanying sound and fury than by tangible substance, whether in
the applause earned from the Congress and business houses or in the
mutually disparate voices of protest from the pro-Swadeshi Bharatiya
Janata party and the Communists. Apart from a few new, sporadically
scattered Ray-Ban showrooms and McDonald 's joints, 'globalization'
remained something Manmohan Singh had done to the Indian economy,
rather than a real and tangible presence. The turbaned economist was
perceived as playing the kind of morale-boosting role for an ailing
indigenous economy that Alan Greenspan was seen as doing in the Clinton-era United States. Industrially stagnated, Marxist-ruled alcutta, of
course, lagged behind the booming economic hotspots of Bombay, Bangalore and Hyderabad, and it is only now with the benefit of hindsight
that I look back upon the irony of the 'strongly dialectical ' relationship
shared by the unsurprising contrasts: Calcutta, the most colonial of
Indian cities, longtime capital of British Indi a, locked in a ' historicist'
past (speaking after the Calcuttan Dipesh Chakrabarty), eluded by the
fast-paced, si licon-implanted sites of global ization; Bombay, Bangalore
and Hyderabad, cities fast gai ning the interest and attention of Bill
Gates and company, fast kinships with their American counterparts in
Seattle and San Jose. Even though the transition from the Queen 's
English to MTV patois had been a smooth one for many, at least in one
major space of cultural-economic negotiations, postcoloniality and globalization had refused to shake hands.
As soon as the issues were severed from an immed iately Indian
context, the weaker cousin, ' liberalization,' melted into ai r, maybe cor16
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roborating its once-real solidity. But what about its 'global ' counterpart?
Not that I thought of During's qucstion- "Does globalization have a
centre? Is it named America?" as I arrived in the United States, but my
first couple of years, spent surrounded by the popular vogue of Buckeye
country music, tractor-pulls, Marlboro and Budlight in the suburban
Midwest, were unblemished by any such concerns. Once again, with the
benefit of hindsight, here was the Hardt-and-Negriesque deconstruction
of the inside-outside binary- if America is the heart of globalization,
who cares about it in the heartland of the heart? If one exports Kentucky
Fried Chicken and Windows 2010 to Bangalore, what does one export
to Toledo, 01 I, or Gary, IN, except maybe the naughty pleasure of uttering "Oh, this J didn't expect. J thought American lifestyle was that of
The Bold and the Beautiful, and McDonald's its culinary ace!"
Not that the cast was that di ffercnt- after all, Wall Street is the
heartland of the heart too, in a different sense! All the same, an eastward
move coinciding with the September 1 1 tragedies- worldwide economic depression does make the globe shrink so- and the buzz of academia conferred on the existent Foucaldian power-schema of
postcoloniality, an even stronger cousin that, oh, threatened to swallow
it. Postcolonialism? That's over. Welcome to globalization!
This popular version of the relationship between the two, depicting
the former 's subsumption into the latter, wa clearly more of a disciplinary gesture than one indicative of their interaction in real life. In other
words, can one offer classes on postcolonial theory any more without
giving globalization its pride of place, if not in the title, in the reading
list? Or analyze ites in the global south without yoking these two, articulating in precise terms the older cousin's subsumption into the younger
and more strapping one's bubbly life, or its vanishing present, if you
wi ll?
Conjunction and subsumption, however, are not quite the ame
thing, and while future hiring committees might ju tifiably want their
postcolonial scholars to know their globalization (or in ales er likelihood, vice versa), it is difficult to see how their disciplinary distinctions
arc made to co llapse completely. Clearly, no theorists feel that way
either. The question of course is what is thi mystifying relationship
between these two.

disC/osure 13
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Incest or not?
During's theorization of this relationship indeed stands out among
several intelligent attempts at it:
The distinction between postcolonialism and globalization is finally
a distinction between a theory of dehistoricization (postcolonialism
as the loss of progressive, teleological time as a master-narrative
and the recovery of 'non-modem' relations to the past and future)
on the one side, and, on the other, a theory of de-territorialization
(globalism) as the retreat of geographical determination and the
gradual transmutation of objects, styles, work into exchangeable
and replicable resources with in a fragmented but unified world- ystem in which new cultural-economic routes, zones or regions proliferate. (389)
Such a definition arrives at the crux of the interdisciplinary negotiation/
transition implicit in the relationship between the two, and subsequently,
in the change of disciplinary focus in reading lists as globalization
comes to claim its pound of flesh next to its historicizcd antecedent on
graduate syllabi. In the two terms used by During, 'dehistoricization'
and 'deterritorialization,' we have respective hints of the critique of historicism, launyhed by subaltern historiographers like Dipesh Chakrabarty, crucial to the project of contemporary postcolonialists, and the
critique of geopoliti cal and gee-economic patterns carried on by globa lization theorists like Saskia Sassen, Joseph Stiglitz and Enrique Dussel.
Disciplinary differences not only contribute to di stinct points of origin,
but decisively mold the respective natures of their discourses to the
point of deciding the amount of cultural capital attached to each:
"Whereas postcolonialism and postmodernism had been developed
inside literary and cultural studies and had only circu lated in the media
when their academic currency was in retreat, globali zation came from
the media and the soc ial sciences, notably, economics, soc iology and
communication studies" (During 387).
Methodological differences also underline the distinction between
postcolonialism and globalization for Arif Dirlik, though he finds the
two united in "their attitudes towards the location of Eu rocentricism:" 1
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Methodologically speaking, postcolonialism in its most popular
forms (in the United States, at least) eschews questions of the structurations of the world in terms of "foundational categories" and
stresses local encounters in the formations of identities; it is in
many ways driven by a radical methodological individualism and is
situationist in its historical explanations ... Globalism on the other
hand draws attention to the structurations of the world by forces
'
.
that operate at the highest level of abstraction and, in some of its
versions, finds in such abstractions the reaffinnation of the scientific promises of socia l theory. (27)
These differences help Dirlik to tie the relationship between these two
frameworks to an issue that has been almost consensually agreed on by
most commentators that of the difference in temporal focus . Whether
or not the ideal aim of postcolonial theory is to dehi toricize notions of
time, as articulated by During and Chakrabarty, surely it place its focus
squarely on the past, whatever it might eventually do with such a ~oc.us.
"Armed with the in ight of the present," Dirlik writes, "postcolonialists
proceed to reinterpret the pa t with the very same insights." .Glo~a~iza
tion clearly refuse to look back, and, in this refusal, seems 1mphc1t a
similar denial of hi toricism that events can be rationally explained by
their linear progress through historical time. More important for our
purposes here, while postcolonialism seeks to dehistoricize our understandings of the past, globalization uses dehistoricism, along with other
weapons, to sever the present from the pa t- what good are tales of
yore in exp licating these troubled time ? A uch, while for Dirlik,
"[p]ostcoloniali m then is merely the current expres ion of forms of
knowledge that have been around for a long time, except that there was
no consciousness of it earlier," globalization is clearly a rupture with the
past: "By contra t, advocate of globalism leave no doubt about ~he
break they seek to accompli h between the present and the past, including a break between a present condition and the factor that may have
.
.
brought about such a condition" (Dirlik 28).
The idea that studies of globalization necess itate an ep1stemolog1cal
break with past traditions is also central to the claims of the signi~ca~t
earlier theorists of globalization . Roland Robertson, whose authority m
fact is invoked by Dirlik on hi way to his argument, con ider insight
earned from the past redundant in coming to terms with "the ba ic and
shifting terms of the contemporary world order" (qtd. in Dirlik 29). But
disC/osure 13
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perhaps the most striking argument in this direction, that of globalization's rupture with the past as opposed to old-style European imperialism, is to be found in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's academic
headline making publication, Empire, though the writer ' characterization as an internet-age Marx and Engels on the Harvard paperback of it
is less a break than a qualification of epistemological paradigms of the
past. This move, as Hardt and Negri theorize, necessarily presupposes
ontological changes that require shifts in disciplinary foci. Reminiscent
ofDuring's point noted earlier, this shift involves the questioning of hi tory as a disciplinary tool in the study of the phenomena of globalization
as contrasted to its indispensability with postcolonial scholars; in other
words, whether or not' historicism' becomes a political bane. For I lardt
and Negri , the hydra has, to invert Linebaugh and Rcdiker' s equation,
undergone a complete metamorphosis or has been reincarnated into a
new avatar: "the construction of Empire is a step forward in order to do
away with any nostalgia for the power structures that preceded it and
refuse any political strategy that involves returning to the old arrangement, such as trying to resurrect the nation-state to protect against global capital" (Hardt and Negri 43).2 That the change is truly a qualitative
one is reflected in the drastic biological transformations of its working
metaphors: "in the contemporary passage to Empire, the structured tunnels of the mole have been replaced by the infinite undulations of the
snake" (Hardt and Negri 57). Admittedly, Hardt and Negri are interested
in the foundation of repressive forces, whether it is the centers of imperialism or the famously virtual or decentered center of Empire, and its
consequent rival, the ' multitude,' torn as it is between the battle-cry of
the activist and the detachment of the theorist. Even so, such interests
end up throwing valuable light on the various conditions resultant from
these foundations, be they the 'past' of colonialization or the 'present'
of globalization.
Is the gulf between the theorist and the activist indeed the producer
of some versjons of disagreement over the nature of the relationship
between postcoloniali ty and globalization? I had an interesting conversation recently with a scholar concerned with the bureaucratic institutions of the British East India company - one who has no qualms about
making the unrelenting declaration that she is more on the 'activist'
side, way more .. .and the fervor of her convictions bespeak it, too. Hardt
and Negri have given her pause- haven't they to us all before we burst
into passionate applause or disappointment?- but post-pause, she
20
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doesn't buy their theory of Empire's drastic rupture with imperialism,
the intricacy of the snake-mole metaphor. I tried a couple of the cliched
points of difference the dispersal of the idea of national interests, the
overriding economic nature of Empire as opposed to its partial (if dominant, nonetheless) role in the dominance of older European colonialism.
The piloting prongs of the post-renaissance European domjnation over
the globe were two, I uttered: the missionary zeal to convert and the
economic greed of trade ... but doesn't the move into outright annexation
put on an overtly political mantle, sooner or later? Redfacedfirang traders they were, in Aurangzeb's stately Mughal court, and even after the
decisive victory over Nawab Siraj-au-daullah on the battlefields of Plassey courtesy, the treachery of Mi1jafar, with weakling Bahadur Shah
Zafar in prison, kept the reins in the hands of the East India Companythough Clive be more of a man than Curzon, many might argue from the
cigar-room of Bath ... but the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 precipitated Her
Majesty Queen Victoria into complete control, didn't it? A Crowned
dominance that would last till the bloodied power-tran fer of 1947. This
isn't network power, surely? Surely the sun that never set on the British
Empire discriminated between the inside and the outside?
NO, says my activist friend. The chartered companies, she says, the
chartered companies. They may not quite be the eighteenth century harbingers of Pepsi and its Indian incarnation in the Maha-Cola, but something in that direction , surely. Even if there be the British and the Dutch
East India company, even if Cli ve and Dupleix's bloody egobattle takes
on the rabid colors of Anglo-French hostility. I had to sigh you-have-apoint-there, and you know, Ian Baucom 's romantic view of the pa tin
"G loba lit, Inc:, or The Cultural Logic of Global Cultural Studies" does
reconstruct the chartered companies in a similar light. But is the refusal
of newness, of ruptures with the past, a kind of hi torical structuralism?
The Oedipus myth replicates itself in Hamlet, as Mon ieur Levi-Strauss
might have said, as imperialism repeats itself in Empire. Perhaps the
answer Iies in Dipeshbabu 's shomoy-gronthi, the stubborn time-knots.
The present, after all, is always in the past, the pa tin the present. As the
south-Asian suba ltern historiographers have pointed out again and
again, the historicist march of time can' t pull the wool over our eyes not
now, not ever!
And the theorist-activist pick is not the only one that accounts for
versions of difference, discrepancy or continuity, depending on your
affil iation. One could go on forever. But more intere ting than a comdisclosure 13
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parative analysis of the two phenomena is how they interact with each
other, on a site which draws in both. Contemporary South-Asia is fertile
ground for this negotiation, and even more so, the figure of the SouthAsian intellectual working in the US academy.

A Knotty kinship, too
"Time, as the expression goes in my language," writes Dipesh
Chakrabarty, "situates us within the structure of a granthi; hence the
Bengali word shomoy-granthi, shomoy meaning 'time' and granthi
referring to joints of various kinds, from the complex formations of
knuckles on our fingers to the joints on a bamboo stick" ( hakrabarly
112). Such time knots account for, as he puts it later, "the plurality that
inheres in the ' now, ' the lack of totality, the constant fragmentariness,
that constitutes one's present" (Chakrabarty 243).
Such a time-knot, I'd like to argue, is to be found in the sites of
negotiation between postcoloniality and globalization, as for instance in
the South-Asian cultural reality of today, and in the lives and works of
contemporary diasporic South-Asian intellectuals. Inasmuch as such
knots exist, they defy any notions of a 'rupture' with the past as claimed
by several high priests of globalization, but in the commona lity of the
crusade they both launch against historicist understandings of time and
their cause-effect flows, perhaps a 'ruptu re' in a smooth line inevitably
ends up in 'knots.' In other words, is the idea of a 'rupture' the temporal
expression of that which the 'knot' is a spatia l metaphor? Causa lity,
after all, is the vi llain here, along with the teleological master-narratives
of history, as During noted before. To hold During's other term, that
reserved for globalization, to this temporalizing lest wou ld, however, be
to complicate things infinitely-does 'de-territorialization' amount to a
space-knot or a spatial rupture? It somehow seems that the motif of 'deterritorialization' is an easier sell among readers of globalization (cybershops, 1-800 numbers, the unreal reality of diaspora) than the reality of
space in these processes as championed by theorists like Sasscn. Take
for instance her idea of the 'global city,' that space which is surely tied
in a strange time-knot with the older forms of modernity and empire, the
sordid-imperial text of Baudelaire and Eliot and Joyce?
The question remains: what sort of relationships can 'de-territorialization' be perceived to retain with older spaces, territories? No teleological, master-narratives of space, surely? I Iere 'rupture' may not be
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such a good friend of ' knot' surely there is more of a knot between the
global south and the north than a drastic rupture? Bangalore and Seattle
seem to be knotting all right, turning the knotty discrepancies of international time-zones into knots of profit- while San Jose sleeps, Bombay
works ... Manhattan keeps the other half of the clock ticking while
Hyderabad earns its night's rest! A knot, mind you, not a continuum ... not the continuous economic subjection, the subject-object binarism, the smoothness of imperial trade implicit in post-renaissance
European colonialism. The prosperous hi-tech cyberspatial Pacific rim
of globalized quasi-future, not the parti-colored Atlantics of colonial
pasts. Shrinkage of the world is hardly tantamount to a rupture, so
unwieldy knots of space arc it. Sassen would agree, one thinks. lsn ' t the
globa l city one such enormous space-knot, with the glitzy Ritz of global
finance and skyrocketing Dow-Jones downtown, the seedy shanties of
underpaid female illegal immigrant labor from across the southern borders? Space-knots arc time-knots too, for in the interlocking of Wall
Street and immigrant ghettos what do we have if not the paradox of the
cyberfuturi tic and the ' nonmodcm?' Interesting how South-Asian metropolitan centers reproduce such di tressing knot of time and space, of
prosperity Bombay' the city of the incredibly affluent Malabar Hills
with chauffeur-driven Mercedes and of Dharavi- the largest, the most
appalling conglomeration of slums in Asia.

What a site!
But what about the itcs where postcoloniality and globalization
have to battle out their idcntitie , to negotiate them? What spatial and
temporal knots clog up there, what space-time rupture ? Speaking of
actual places/geographica l locations/nations, few parts of the world
occupy as explosive a position as Latin America and the Caribbean
islands in this patio-temporal negotiation. Already parti-colored with
the imprints of the colonialism of various nations, Latin America and
more strikingly, the Caribbean, occupy strategic po itions with respect
to globalization owing to what e lse- their physical proximity to the
United Statcs. 3
Central and south America remain the most volatile itc of the
myriad of these power plays - beginning from the economic domination, through outright political big-brotherhood to the flagrant trinity of
militarism-drugs-illegal immigration. In the Caribbean, for instance,
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colonial legacies like cricket thrive on (as more and more former colonies flex cricketing muscles over a quick-weakening English cricket
team), and Oxbridge commands more socio-intellectual glamour than
its closer American counterparts. Commonwealth prizes and scholarships get administered and literary and cricketing celebrities continue to
be knighted by the British Crown as well. But at the end of the day, the
power-breathing proximity of the US is real enough, in a way it is not in
other postcolonial countries, as those in Asia and Africa, where the US,
with all its power and glamour, is far away. Clearly, in a book like
Jamaica Kincaid's A Small Place, time-knots are well-knotted with
space-knots- British co lonialism is the past that is knotted into the
present, while the geopolitics of power place it in the volati le Central
American space-knot of US power, military, economic and political.
And in its cinematic rereading, Stephanie Black's Life and Debt, the
White House dominated World Bank and its loan-traps remain the central concern. Such a network of imperialism and Empire also crisscrosses the formerly Spanish and Portuguese dominated Latin America
and its North American counterpart, Mexico, the latter being the clo c t
southern (clearly in both senses of the word) neighbor of the debated
center of Empire.
In fact, the integrity of the notion of 'southernness ' of Latin
America (once again, both geographica lly and politically) with respect
to the US is precisely what is under threat in the wake of globalization,
leading to what I'd consider one of the most critical space-knots of our
times. Is Latin America more of a reality down south, or in the Bronx,
Miami or Los Angeles? Reflecting on the impact of thi s dramatic spaceknot (even people-knot) on relevant area studies, the Latin Americanist
Alberto Moreiras writes:
U.S. Latinamericanism is certainly conditioned, although perhaps
not yet to a sufficient degree, by the drastic demographic changes
and the massive Latin American immi gration to the country in
recent decades. U.S. Latinamericanism can no longer pretend
merely to be an epistemic concern with the geographi c other south
of the border. Instead, the borderlands have moved northward and
within. (Moreiras 83)
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Children of Incest?
Oiasporic intellectuals, precisely those from the f~nner colonies of
European countries now working in the US academy, it seems to me,
embody the dualism of both the time-knots and space-knots as thos~
I've been discussing. I' d like to argue that such intellectuals c~m?nse
one of the most significant sites of the negotiation of post~olomalt~ and
globalization, in the manner in which they must ne~essanly reconcile
their identities as postcolonials (with respect to their legacy of postrenaissance European colonialism) to those of diasporic professionals.
whose location within the 'metropolis' of Empire (a la Hardt and Negn)
has largely been contingent upon processes of globaliza~ion. . . ,,
Moreiras's essay "Globa l Fragments: A Second Latmamencamsm
indeed demon trates how erroneous any split between the phenomena of
globalization and its studies in the institutional space of the academy is
how the tatter, instead of being an objective, independent assessment
of the e geopolitical practices from a .space outside th~m , is r~t,her
implicit in such proces cs and renect1ve of the~ . Les~te.Sklair s assessment of 'Third World elites' surely applies to d1a pone mtellectuals
from the global south working in the metropolitan univer ities of the
US:
Third World elites do not form a comprador class in the sense of
serving First World interests or assimilating into western culture.
Rather, they constitute a transnational capitalist class wh~se members act in the interest of the global system. Like tran national corporations (TNCs) their allegiance is not to the na~i~~- tale but to a
global consumerism that thrives on cultural hybnd1ttes. (Sharpe
185)

Some important qualification are in order here, in.a much a~ such
intellectuals are engaged in critiques of cultural and ep1stemolog1cal
paradigms of which processes of postcolonial~ty and global~zation are a
part. From one such diasporic intellectual ArJun App~dura1, ~omes. an
important insight about the ways in which they compltcate ept tem1c.
knots as it were in the creation of what he calls " ideoscapes," reflectmg
the in,creasingly complicated realities of postcolonial cultur.es in tl~e
wake of globalization: "The fluidity of ideoscapes i comp heated m particular by the growing dia poras (both voluntary and involuntary) of
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intellectuals who continuously inject new meaning-streams into the discourse of democracy in different parts of the world" (37). Whether or
not postcoloniality or globalization can enter ' history after Euroccntricism,' the only site of poss ible critique of Eurocentricism i the
diasporic intellectuals, agents of empowerment located within Eurocentric matrices of power/knowledge - notably the academy. Well-versed in
the Eurocentric canons of knowledge, these intellectuals of postcolonial
origin - or of 'Third World,' to use a more controversial term engage
in their critique. Dirlik writes:
The contemporary critique of Eurocentri sm is driven not by victimization by Eurocentrism but by empowerment withi n it. Foremost
among modern critics of Eurocentrism arc those who arc not marginalized by Eurocentrism or left out of its structure of power, but
those who claim ' hybridities' that give access to both Euroccntrism
and to its Others, probably more of the former than the latter. If Orientalism was a product of Euro-Americans located in "contact
zones" outside Euro-America on the margins of non-Euro-American societies, anti-Eurocentrism is a product of contact zones
located at the hearts of Euro-America or in transnationa l structures
or circuits of power. (Dirlik 36)
Things were probably simpler when in a slightly earli er period the
postcolonial intellectual worked with the cultures conseq uent upon the
encounters of the former empires and their colonies, even though such
encounters and their resultant cultures themselves amounted to an unsettling of geographic and epistemic boundaries of earlier canons. Such
int~llectuals might have talked about the works of Y.S. Naipau l and
Chmua Achebe or the large-scale immigration to Britain from its former
colo.nies. As l~te as 1995, Jenny Sharpe wrote: "A glance at any English
curnculum wtll reveal that the Anglophone writings of former British
colonies are now an essential offering. This inclusion represents the
effort to reshape British literature in the same way that the canon of
American literature had been transformed by the introduction of minority literatures and cultures" ( J 8 1). But with the spread of what Hardt and
Negri calls Ei:npire, es~ecially towards the latter half of the 20th century,
and fina1ly with the tnumph of global capitalism in a post-co ld war era,
the new behemot~ of globalization increasingly has come to comp licate
an already complicated phenomenon of postco lonia lity vis-a-vis post26
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renaissance European imperialism. Whether or not discourses of globalization were about to engulf postcolonial studies, drastic epistemic
changes were now in order again. To give an example from south-Asian
literature, if the former practice involved study of the fictions of Salman
Rushdie and Raja Rao, the newer cu ltures necessitated encounters with
the diasporic implications of the works of Bharati Mukherjee and Pico
Iyer. Questions as to what might be the relationship between the former
with the later corpus are therefore, not easy to answer, and easy blanket
nomenclatures like Anglophone Indian literatures will not do what with
writers like Mukherjee and Mistry being more amenable to being linked
to the American and Canadian canons, respectively.

The santal in the Nike sweatshop: SouthAsian insights
Clearly, the south-Asian intellectuals working in the US academy,
as much as those from Central and South America, are faced with the
complex epistemic negotiations of the cultures of postcoloniality and
globa lization even a they deal with the interaction of the two processes
within the matrices of their very identities. Even though they haven't
been touched by the immediacy of Empire as the Caribbean and Latin
America have been, the case of the south-Asian diasporic intellectual is
interesting, notably in the momentum postco lonial scholarship from that
part of the world has gathered in the US academy, perhaps partly attendant on the duration and impact of British colonialism in the e part
Indi a being the fabled "jewel in the Crown" of the British Monarch.
Many would probably go so fa r as to consider Subaltern Studies, originally an offshoot of South-Asian area studies, to be the mo t significant
paradigm of postcolonialist epistemic practices in the US academy
today.
The case of the south-Asian diasporic intellectual i therefore an
occasion to consider this signi ficant clement of the interaction of po tco lon iality and globa lization, namely, area studies. Many of the intellectuals negoti ating this tension were origi nally (and in mo t ca es, till
are) area studies scholars whose disciplinary structures, already at least
partially contingent upon (post)co loniali ty arc now becoming infinitely
more complicated by the advent of globalization. With respect to the
area studies he's concerned with Moreiras ee , after Hardt, the transition from area studic Latinamcricanism to a Latinamcricani m contindisclosure 13
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gent upon processes and discourses of globalization as a move from the
work of an epistemic society of discipline to that of an epistemic society
of control. Important assumptions about the ways of under landing
alterity and the resultant Orientalist practices are implicit here: "If it is
fair to say that the first Latinamericanism operates under the assumption
that alterity can always, and indeed must always, be theoretically
reduced, the second Latinamericanism understands itself in epistemic
solidarity with the residual voices, or silences, of Latin American alterity" (Moreiras 89).
This dualism resonates with During's encounter of critical postcolonialism and globalization: "[T]he category of globalization has, for
the most part, superceded that of 'postcolonia lism' and that critical postcolonialism needs to be seen not simp ly as globa lization 's enemy but (in
part) as its effect. That is, globalization and critical postcolonialism
have a weakly dialectical relation" (During 385). This resonance i a
significant one, as critical postcolonialism is the force that is dcci ivc in
the formation of subaltern nationalisms, as a ripo te both to colonialisms of the past and the globalizations of the present and the future. It i
in this troubled site of subaltern nationalism that area studies makes significant discoveries with respect not only to (post)colonialism and globalization, but also to revisionist historiography, as is exemplarily
demonstrated in the South-Asian case. In The Nation and Its Fragments,
the subaltern historiographer Partha Chatterjee cha ll enges the notion
that nationalism is a purely Western import to co lonial and postcolonial
countries by showing how in India the real nationalist project was
launched not in the outer/material domain of national culture (where the
West had established its dominance) but in the inner/spiritual domain
(where indigenous superiority was taken for granted): "The home, I suggest, was not a complementary but rather the original site on which the
hegemonic project of nationalism was launched" (Chatterjee 136).
When South-Asian elites come to occupy the position of diasporic
intellectuals (a twice-exiled one, as Said points out in his influential
essay on the subject) in the US, they invariably end up acquiring a di fferent kind of consciousness about their location in their own nations
and with respect to such subaltern nationalisms easy responses to the
twin processes of imperialism and Empire. It is not surpri sing, therefore,
that such diasporic South-Asian intellectuals have taken recourse to
revisionist hi storiography in order to critically reexamine the ideologies
and realities of subaltern nationalisms and to seek to restore agency to
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the various marginalized populations within the nation (a red-herring
effort accord ing to many, even though the gesture remains indispensab le). Aijaz Ahmad, in In Theory, engages in such a critique of subaltern
nationalisms even as he critiques Euro-American rhetoric of 'otherness. ' Partha Chatterjee engages in a similar project in his effort to tell
the suppressed stories in the female autobiographies in 19th century
Bengal. He writes, after telling the story of the Bengali stage actress
Noti Binodini:
Indeed, the opening up of the whole problematic of the national
project within and outside the domain of the state makes it possible
for us now to make the radical struggle with colonialism, contained
many po sibilities of the authentic, creative, and plural develop-..
ment of social identities that were violently disrupted by the political history of the postcolonial state seeking to replicate the modular
forms of the modem nation-state. ( 156)
Also imilar is the revisioni t historiography of the members of the Subaltern Studies Co llective in their project to restore agency to the subaltern in a British colonial or bourgeois nationalist historiography. Dipesh
Chakrabarty's work becomes especially interesting here, in that his critique of historicism and the teleological, rationalizing processes of the
master narratives of history is simultaneously directed at the secular
rationalisms implicit in the work of the suba ltern historiographers a at
the privileged nexus of reason and subjectivity structuring Eurocentric
hi toriography that "enabled European domination of the world in the
nineteenth century."
Much of the critical force of South-Asian subaltern studies I'd like
to argue, comes from the diasporic locations of its practitioners that are
made contingent by a globalization that does not hesitate to extract its
pound of flesh (read 'share of immigrants') from the academy. It is in
this critical force that a significant interaction of postcoloniality and globalization is to be found. Arguably, subaltern studies, with its stronger
mooring in postcolonial cpistemologies remains oriented towards the
past, while the realities of globalization continue to dee~ ively af~ect ~he
present and the future. But, as Moreiras has so aptly pomted out m his
essay, it is precisely the realities of globalization including its immi?ration of elite and subaltern populations, that de tabilize uch boundanes.
Arca studies arc, therefore, much more than the mean of excrci ing
disclosure 13
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power/knowledge over the 'Orient,' they arc critical to apprehending
the geopolitics of the contemporary world order, especially with regard
to the global expansion of US capitalism. That the traditional grids of
power and subjectivity which characterized the organization of postcolonial studies since Said's Orienta/ism are inadequate to apprehending
the realities of the "Disjuncture and Difference in Global Cultural Economy" is made clear by Appadurai and the various perspectival constructs that he calls 'scapes:' "The new global cultural economy has to
be seen as a complex, overlapping, disjunctive order that cannot any
longer be understood in terms of existing center-periphery models (even
those that might account for multiple center and peripheries" (Appadurai 32). Appadurai seems to carry I Iardt and Negri 's project even farther
in the fragmentation of the sites of power, and it is no surprise that
Simon During finds in his work "a theory of cultural globalization
brushed by post-structuralism - a celebratory rather than critical globalism," that perceives a world which is "a radical departure from the colonial" (During 388). Appadurai therefore, i a prime exemplar of the
South-Asianist who seems to have completed the transition from po tcoloniality to globalization.
In spite of all the post-structuralist de-centering of power, in the figuration of postcolonial theory within a globalized sphere, the crucial figure remains that of the subaltern. It is she who is con figured in the
Foucaldian power/knowledge grid in the face of privi lcged western subjectivities as signified, albeit in different ways, in both co lonialism and
the expansion of global capital. This is where the work of Gayatri Spivak becomes significant. From the beginning, Spivak has maintained a
significant but critical involvement with the Suba ltern Studies Collective, as for instance in her essay "Subaltern Studies: Dcconstructing I Iistoriography," where she foregrounds the notion of 'subaltern effect' as a
means of apprehending the subaltern consciousness. Spivak carries on
this project in her celebrated essay, "Can the subaltern speak?" spec ifically the problem of restoring voice and agency to the subaltern - and in
her 1999 book, A Critique of Postco /onial Reason, where she chooses
the term " native informant." It is Spivak's work that most clearly tics
the subaltern from British colonial history of South-Asia with the marginalized and the disem powered in the imperialist expansions of global
capitalism - the santal and the Rani of Sirmur and the poor Bangladeshi
woman harnessed, in flagrant violation of her human rights, in the capitalist systems of transnational corporations.

Perhaps, it is also time to rephrase the earlier question in a SouthAsian context will there be any South-Asian postcolonialist working
in the US academy who's not also a globalization theorist? A book like
Aijaz Ahmad's In Theo1y provides a complex answer in the negative.
Ripostes to Wes tern theorization of the ' rhetoric of otherness,' in this
book, ties in as much with the geopolitics of power in the world-system
as with the legacies of English education and canon-formation in postcolonial India. At such moments, it does seem that imperialism and
Empire are not such different animals as Negri and Hardt would make
them out to be. Therefore, why should the move from postcoloniality to
globalization be such a drastic transformation for the South-Asianist or
for any intellectual from the global south working in the metropolitan
university?
The phenomenon of colonialism, however, still remains a bigger
and more pervasive question in the South-Asian context much more
so than that of globalization, making scholars like Appadurai, therefore,
a rarer breed. No South-Asianist has, for instance, engaged in a shockingly perceptive psychoanalytic dissection of globalization as has been
done to the phenomenon of (post)colonia lism by that brilliant Fanon of
India, Ashish Nandy, in his classic The Intimate Enemy. As is easily evident through, say, a comparison of South-Asian immigration patterns to
the UK and the US (assuming that immigration to the former is more of
a postcolonial phenomenon while in the latter case it has been accelerated by the logic of globa lization- a shaky corollary yet with some truth
in it), and as implied by Sharpe, the reality of the South-Asian diaspora
in the American capital of Empire is, in some ways, an artificial or a
synthetic one - even in comparison to the immigrant populations from
Latin America and many parts of East Asia. The lack of a clear historical (as with Britain and its former colonies) or geographical link (a the
US has with Mexico and Central America, or even between east Asia
and California) between the South-Asian countries and the US limits
such immigration to a small group of elites, to its rich, its educated, and
its skilled professionals if we choose to ignore the smaller immigration streams that took place during the west coast railroad constructions
of the early 20th century. The epistemic earthquake in Latin American
studies that Moreiras described due to large-scale immigration to El
Norte- creating communities that are perhaps more 'natural and
' moored in reality' with populations engaged in everything from executive positions in the Cabinet to pay-by-hour farm work- i clearly a far
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cry with respect to South-Asian studies in the US. Unless one considers
the global spread of Indian indented laborers in the past to places as farflung as Fiji and Africa as a past paradigm of globalization, it i perhaps
safe to say that the 'real' negotiation of postco loniality and globalization
hasn ' t even properly begun with respect to the diasporic intellectual
from South Asia- not to the degree with which it has intensified in
regard to the Caribbean and Latin America. What is visible here, due to
the distinction of postcolonial scholarship from that part of the world, is
arguably, only the tip of an iceberg that the future wi ll reveal more of.

Notes
1. Exactly what th is attitude is Dirlik chooses not to amplify, and the

question that comes to my mind immediately is whether ei ther of these
two phenomena can enter, to use Dirlik 's own phrase, Hhistory after
Eurocentricism?"
2. In Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker's The Many !leaded fh1dra ,
ironically, the hydra, constituting of slaves, rebel sai lors and pirates of
post-renaissance Atlantic, signifies something approximating the ragbag
collection of forces that wou ld be li kely to counter the metamorpho ing
hydra of Hardt and Negri, which of course in their book is a metaphor of
the hegemonic force of Empire itself.
3. Of course, to what extent the US is the center of the phenomena of
global ization- which wou ld entai l dealing with the issue as to what
extent global ization has a center at all is a heated issue. I lardt and
Negri's fascinating chapter on the US constitution is theoretically foundational here, even though it needs no ghost to tell us what is the Mecca
of capitalism in the world today, the singular pole of power in a postCold War era. The concept of the non-annexing imperialism of network
power, that destroyer of inside-outside binarism implicit in the expansionist philosophy of the US constitution, sounds fascinat ing indeed,
perhaps a tad too alluring to our intellectual consumerism. The transnational nature of globalization 's prime vehic les, the multinational corporations, causes a mild erosion of the idea of a nation as a center but
like my friend the scholar-activist, most people wou ld say that ca~ ' t
'fool' them. And going by Empire, Empire is not merely economicnetwork power is more complex than that.
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